Do ''new economy'' jobs rely more on ''alternative'' or ''contingent'' employment relationships, rather than traditional relationships? Classified on the basis of employment in high-technology (hightech) industries, new economy jobs are no less traditional. However, based on residence in high-tech cities, contingent and alternative employment relationships are more common in new economy jobs. Finally, ''new economy'' jobs defined as those in industries with the fastest growth rely much more on contingent or alternative employment relationships; a large share of this difference is driven by employment in construction and personnel supply services, where employment is perhaps ''intrinsically'' contingent or alternative. D
Introduction
While many commentators have tried to define the ''new economy,'' researchers have only recently begun to grapple with defining the new economy, exploring its consequences, and testing hypotheses regarding what makes the new economy ''new.'' In our view, one important set of hypotheses regards consequences for the nature of the employment relationship. In particular, it is often argued that new economy jobs are less likely to use traditional employment relationships, and more likely to rely on ''alternative'' or ''contingent'' work. The goal of this paper is to explore evidence on whether the new economy is indeed associated with less traditional employment relationships.
The ''new economy'' means many things to many people, although all emphasize to some extent the role of information technology and the information sector of the economy.
1 One set of definitions refers broadly to an economy that operates differently from the past in some fundamental way. Thus, to some investors, the ''new economy'' means (or meant) a world in which stock market valuations do not depend in the usual ways on earnings and other fundamentals, a view spurred in particular by the financial performance of information technology companies (at least prior to the recent sharp declines in the NASDAQ).
2 To Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, it apparently refers to productivity gains driven by information technology that allow (or allowed) the economy to grow at a fast pace without igniting inflation. 3 An alternative macroeconomic perspective is that information technology has reduced the component of the business cycle driven by inventory fluctuations. 4 To business people, it may mean a world that rewards innovation and new concepts more than machinery and production, 5 as well as an increasingly globalized marketplace.
6 These ''aggregate'' definitions of the new economy have been the dominant foci in writing on the new economy in the popular media, most likely because the discussion occurred largely in the context of rather striking macroeconomic and financial market developments.
However, a second set of definitions of the new economy-more germane to this paper-focuses more on the world of work, arguing that new types of jobs that may share some common features, and are different from the old, are emerging. 7 Frequently, the identification of such jobs is tied to the broader definitions of the new economy mentioned above. For example, the sectors thought to be fueling productivity gains-such as software, financial services, media, and consulting-are sometimes viewed as new economy industries.
8 Reich (2001) focuses on the increasing demand in the new economy for creative and innovative talent as opposed to the talent to bring products to the market. Finally, a more ''mechanical'' definition of new economy jobs is simply those that are growing the fastest; assuming this faster growth continues, such jobs will clearly represent a larger share of whatever new economy emerges. 2 See D'Andrea Tyson (2001) . For evidence on this hypothesis, see Bond and Cummins (2000) . 3 See Miller (2001) . For evidence on this hypothesis, see Gordon (2000) and Black and Lynch (2000) . 4 See DeLong and Summers (2001) . 5 See Encyclopedia of the New Economy (http://www.hotwired.lycos.com/special/ene/). 6 See Shepard (1997) . 7 There are also other microeconomic characterizations of the new economy that do not focus so much on the world of work, emphasizing the nonrival nature of information-related goods (DeLong and Summers, 2001) , and different cost structures in new economy industries, in particular high fixed costs and low variable costs (Varian, 2001) . 8 See Mandel (1999) . 9 See US Department of Commerce (2000) .
Definitions of the new economy based on the world of work naturally raise questions about whether jobs in the new economy are different from jobs in the old economy, and what the implications of these differences are for workers, firms, and labor market institutions and policies. In particular, there are at least three reasons to believe that the development of the new economy may foretell changes in the employment relationship. First, an extensive literature has recently developed documenting changes in the employment relationship in the United States in the latter part of the 1990s. This literature generally did not establish dramatic and fundamental changes in the employment relationship, giving lie to assertions that long-term jobs were disappearing. It did, though, appear to establish two results. First, workers who had previously experienced the most stable and secure jobs-most notably, perhaps, more educated and older workers in managerial and professional occupations-had begun in the 1990s to experience decreased job stability and job security. 10 Second, although comparable data over time are hard to come by, it is fairly clear that there has been growth over the 1990s in workers employed in flexible staffing arrangements. 11 The simple coincidence of the timing of changes in the employment relationship and the apparent emergence of the new economy naturally raises the question of the link between the new economy and the employment relationship.
The second reason to examine whether and how the new economy impacts the employment relationship is that some of the technological changes that are conjectured to underlie high productivity growth are likely to influence the labor market. One potential channel of influence includes the hypothesized link between the growth of computer use in the workplace and increases in the demand for more educated workers.
12 A second, more directly tied to the employment relationship, concerns the role of technology in general, and information technology in particular, in changing the organization of work and production systems and sometimes the nature of the goods or services produced. 13 The third motivation for investigating the link between the new economy and the employment relationship is simply the popular view that the advent of the new economy threatens traditional employment relationships. Commentators from a variety of quarters often describe new economy jobs as inherently unstable, and relying on nontraditional or ''contingent'' forms of employment. A few examples follow:
''In the new economy, the employer/employee employment relationship has been turned upside down. Employees no longer stay with a single company for their entire career. . . A key to guaranteeing employment and income security for new economy employees is to ensure that they are equipped with the skill base to easily move from one job to the next. . . Companies are shifting to a smaller core workforce, which is supplemented with a contingent workforce that has the skills needed at the moment.'' ''There is nothing inevitable or preordained that requires New Economy jobs to be cheap-wage, nonunion, and insecure. But it is up to us to challenge the New Economy evangelists who preach their antiunion gospel. '' 15 ''Many new economy jobs hire contractors, not employees. The theory is that they will bring you on, give you no benefits, pay you for the project they hire you for, and then let you go. '' 16 This paper addresses the hypothesis embodied in the above quotes-that the new economy challenges and changes the nature of the employment relationship, reducing reliance on ''traditional'' employment and increasing the use of ''contingent'' or ''alternative'' work arrangements (including, but not limited to, use of contractors). While conjectures about the impact of the new economy on the employment relationship abound, we are aware of no evidence based on representative samples of workers on which these conjectures are based.
The fundamental difficulty in an empirical analysis of this question is operationalizing the phrase ''new economy.'' As explained above, the phrase has many meanings, and only a subset of them-in particular, those that define the new economy based on jobs-points to direct links between the new economy and the employment relationship and leads to feasible strategies for exploring these links by distinguishing between ''new economy'' and ''traditional economy'' jobs. Even then, these latter definitions provide relatively little guidance in identifying jobs that characterize the new economy. Thus, a major substantive concern in this paper is trying to identify such jobs.
Information on the nature of the employment relationship is more readily available. In particular, the Current Population Survey (CPS) Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements supplements (often referred to as the Contingent Work Supplements, or CWS) elicit information on workers describing the nature of their employment relationship in considerable detail. Thus, after specifying a number of reasonable ways of defining new economy jobs, the nature of the employment relationship in these and other jobs is compared using the CWS data.
Identifying new economy workers
Because we are studying the link between the new economy and the employment relationship, our attempts to identify new economy workers rely on those perspectives that most closely tie the definitions of the new economy to the types of jobs people do. However, we want to emphasize two important qualifications. First, even among this limited set of perspectives on the new economy, definitions are frustratingly vague. Thus, while we have chosen some methods of identifying new economy workers that seem to be consistent with both some of the commentaries about the new economy and common sense, we by no means intend to claim that our methods are definitive. Rather, we hope to 15 Bahr (2000) . 16 Triplett (2000) . ' 'get the ball rolling'' with regard to research on this question, using some plausible and sensible classification schemes that may also motivate other researchers to think about and propose alternatives.
Second, if the new economy is more appropriately defined along dimensions other than the jobs people do, then our classification-by dividing workers into groups that do not correspond to the real distinction-may come up with little difference between new economy and other workers, when in fact the differences exist. As an example, if the new economy is defined primarily by how work is organized, and the distribution of new economy ''workplaces'' has little to do with the ways we usually define the jobs people do, we may end up looking at a classification of workers that has little to do with new economy vs. traditional economy jobs, and hence incorrectly conclude that new economy jobs are not characterized by different employment relationships. Similarly, but farther afield, if the new economy is defined as a world in which investors look at factors other than economic fundamentals in deciding upon the allocation of financial capital, there is no necessary link to job-based distinctions among workers. On the other hand, by using a multiplicity of definitions of new economy workers, we may nonetheless manage to pick up some of these distinctions. As an example, a definition based on industries with the fastest growth may capture those industries to which capital is flowing, and a definition based on high-technology (high-tech) employment may highlight those industries in which technology-driven transformation of the workplace is more prevalent. With these qualifications stated, the remainder of this section describes the methods we use to classify new economy workers.
High-technology industries
Our first classification of new economy workers is based on employment in high-tech industries. One common focus in discussions of the new economy is the emphasis on technology and knowledge in the workplace. To some extent, the focus is on work in the information technology sector. 17 More generally, though, this perspective focuses on work that relies heavily on technology and that rewards knowledge and innovation more than production.
18 Thus, the first approach we use to classifying new economy workers is one based on employment in what might be considered ''new economy industries,'' based on heavy reliance upon technological and scientific personnel.
To avoid picking and choosing industries in a subjective manner, which might influence the results, we use a Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) study (Hecker, 1999 ) that seeks to identify ''high-technology industries.'' The BLS study uses a definition of high-tech industries based on employment of workers in two categories: technology-related 17 As an example, the strike at Verizon by the Communications Workers of America was billed by some as the first major battle between unions and the new economy (Boslett, 2000) . See also the comments of Paul David in Schiffrin (2000) . 18 See, for example, Reich (2001) and the assertion in the Encyclopedia of the New Economy (http:// www.hotwired.lycos.com) that, ''When we talk about the new economy, we're talking about a world in which people work with their brains instead of their hands. '' occupations, and research and development.
19 Industries are then classified as high-tech if the proportion of employment in both of these categories is at least twice the average for all industries. This yields a list of 25 Census industries, which are displayed in Table 1 . It includes many industries readily recognizable as high-tech-such as computers and related equipment, and scientific and controlling instruments. But it also includes some industries-such as plastics, synthetics, and resins, as well as paints, varnishes, and related products-not commonly thought of as high-tech, but which nonetheless use a fair amount of scientific personnel. 20 19 The occupational information comes from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) Surveys covering 1993 Surveys covering , 1994 Surveys covering , and 1995 . The technology-related occupations include: engineers; life and physical scientists; mathematical specialists; engineering and science technicians; computer specialists; and engineering, scientific, and computer managers. Research and development workers in the OES are identified in these occupations, as well as a variety of others (see Hecker, 1999, p. 19) . Henry et al. (1999) .
An important point that Hecker makes is that the classification of high-tech industries he uses is relatively robust. In particular, he provides a comparison of the industries chosen by his criteria with those chosen in two earlier BLS reports, and notes the substantial overlap. This implies that the results we obtain using the industry list in this 1999 BLS report are unlikely to reflect idiosyncratic features of this particular list. Indeed, the study also provides a comparison to lists of high-tech industries from non-BLS studies, and these, too, have substantial overlap with the 1999 BLS report, although they tend to be narrower. Thus, there is reason to believe that most reasonable lists of high-tech industries would coincide relatively closely with the one on which we base our analysis.
Among the high-technology industries, there are seven that can be classified as information technology industries according to the US Department of Commerce study by Henry et al. (1999) . These seven are indicated in the second column of Table 1 . We also investigate contingent and alternative employment based on this more restricted definition of information technology industries.
High-technology cities
Our second method of classifying new economy workers relies more on geography, classifying workers based on employment in cities with high concentrations of high-tech employment. A definition of new economy workers based solely on employment in industries employing a disproportionately high number of technological or scientific personnel may miss two important dimensions of new economy jobs. First, some jobs or industries associated with the new economy may rely heavily on computers and software, but not in a technological capacity. Second, there may be jobs that ''grow up'' around the high-tech sector that are not intensive users of scientific or technological personnel. An example that might fit both of these descriptions is employment in dot-com companies involved in a variety of service provision businesses-jobs that may capture the innovative and knowledge-based nature of new economy jobs, yet not have a strong scientific or technical component, or at least not be classified as scientific or technical occupations. Alternatively, in an effort to be flexible, dynamic, and focused, high-tech startups may be more likely than traditional companies to use personnel supply services for outsourcing nontechnical positions such as janitorial and clerical support. In such a case, we would expect to see more contingent and alternative work in high-tech cities but not necessarily among workers in high-tech industries.
To try to classify workers in a manner that moves away from purely industry-based measures, but captures workers in high-tech industries as well as the jobs that cluster around them geographically, our second classification of new economy workers is based on those employed in cities categorized as ''high-tech.'' Use of this label for cities has become commonplace-applied to places like Silicon Valley, Seattle, Boston, etc.-with these cities typically viewed as the centers of the new economy.
21 By looking at all workers in high-tech cities, we should capture relatively more people in jobs in high-tech industries and occupations, as well as those in the industries and occupations that tend to exist or arise in proximity to clusters of high-tech employment. 21 See, for example, Paton (1999) and Sunnucks (2001) .
Again, to avoid making subjective selections of cities that might influence our results, we sought a list of high-tech cities from an external research source. In fact, paralleling to some extent the lists of high-tech industries that researchers have compiled, a few research institutes have recently tried to come up with lists of high-tech cities. We chose to rely on a Brookings Institution study (Cortright and Mayer, 2001 ). This study begins with a list of 14 high-tech cities that, according to the authors, are those ''most frequently mentioned in the popular literature'' (p. 9). It then ranks these cities based on relative employment in the following industries-computer and electronic product manufacturing, software publishers, information services and data processing services, and computer systems design and related services 22 -and provides an overall ranking based on relative employment in these industries. The top 10 cities based on this overall ranking, on which we focus our analysis, are displayed in the first column of Table 2 . 23 By way of contrast, a recent study by the Progressive Policy Institute (2001) (PPI) uses a wide variety of indicators to identify high-tech cities. Most of them are not based on employment (and when they are, factors like educational level are used, rather than working in the high-tech sector), and quite a few of the indicators relate to technology directly (such as domain name registrations, computers in schools, broadband providers, etc.). However, like the BLS industry classification discussed above, alternative methods of classifying cities come up with quite similar lists. In particular, 7 of top 10 cities in the Brookings ranking are also in the top 10 cities in the PPI ranking, and the remaining three cities in the Brookings top 10 are ranked 11, 15, and 16 in the PPI ranking. 24 Conversely, the three cities in the PPI top 10 not included in the Brookings top 10 are included in the original list of 14 cities with which the Brookings study begins. 25, 26 Finally, while the motivation for looking at high-tech cities is to capture jobs related to high-tech industries although not necessarily in these industries, the list of high-tech cities tends, not surprisingly given the way the list was selected, to include cities with large shares of high-tech workers. This is illustrated in the second column of Table 2 , which shows the share of each city's employment in the new economy industries based on high-tech employment (from Table 1 ), computed from CPS data. 27 These range from 22 These industries are based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). 23 Given that the original universe of 14 cities was not chosen based on a systematic data analysis, we thought it preferable to take a subset of these 14 that actually ranked highest on an objective measure. 24 These three cities are, respectively, Atlanta, Portland, and Phoenix. The Brookings study looks at the San Jose Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA), which does not include San Francisco, whereas the PPI study uses an area that combines San Jose and San Francisco (using Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas). In doing these comparisons between the two lists of cities, we have treated these as the same areas. 25 These are Raleigh -Durham, Washington, and Salt Lake City. 26 Another study of high-tech cities, from the Milken Institute (DeVol, 1999) , is based on high-tech industry output (as a share). However, this study includes many very small cities, such as Lubbock, TX; Pocatello, ID; and Atlantic-Cape May, NJ. As these cities are too small to study reliably with the CPS data, this classification of cities is somewhat less useful. Nonetheless, 11 of 14 cities in the original Brookings list are in the top 50 cities reported in the Milken study. 27 In this and all subsequent CPS calculations, observations were dropped if allocated data were needed to identify a worker's industry. City codes were not allocated. City codes were not included in 1995 CWS and we therefore exclude 1995 data from the analysis of high-tech cities. We verified that excluding 1995 from our other analyses does not qualitatively affect the main results (reported in Tables 6 and 8 ).
a high of 36% in San Jose to a low of 11% in Phoenix. By way of comparison, the last row presents the share for other comparable cities not on the list, 28 which is just over 10%. For the other high-tech cities, high-tech employment is overrepresented by a ratio of about 1.3 -2.
High-growth industries
Finally, we use a classification of new economy workers based on employment in the fastest-growing industries. The fastest-growing industries, whether or not they have a strong technological basis, are destined to be a growing part of the economy, and thus in a mechanical sense-as long as their higher growth rates persist-are destined to be increasingly important in the new economy. It would not be entirely surprising, of course, if some of the industries chosen on the basis of high-tech employment are also among the fastest-growing industries, since the equating of ''high-tech employment'' and ''new economy'' in the popular view is no doubt linked in part to the growth of the former. But other factors such as changing demographic structure and changing levels and distribution of income may also-via demand shifts-impact which jobs are becoming more prevalent in the economy.
To identify the fastest-growing industries, we used CPS Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files to measure employment growth by Census industry from 1996 to 2000. Table 3 ). The cities are ranked from top to bottom based on the study's total high-tech employment ''location quotient.'' The shares in the second column are for employment in the 25 industries listed in Table 1 . They are computed (using sample weights) from the CWS 1997, 1999, and 2001 files; the 1995 supplement is not used because it does not have city codes. The last row includes the 51 additional cities with more than 500,000 workers on average over the 1996 -2000 period.
Growth was calculated as the change in the industry's employment share from 1996 to 2000. To avoid outliers caused by inaccurate measurements, only industries with an employment share of at least 0.25% in 2000 were considered. Among these, we took the 20 industries with the highest growth. 29 These are listed in Table 3 . Three industries chosen on this criterion overlap with new economy industries based on high-tech employment, with computer and data processing services first on the list. But none of the other 22 high-tech industries is among the 20 fastest-growing industries, and indeed quite a few industries with little obvious relationship to hightech employment or technology more generally appear, including: construction, elementary and secondary schools; child day care services; offices and clinics of physicians; etc. At the same time, quite a few industries that might be associated with a growing emphasis on information or information technology also appear, including: credit agencies, n.e.c.; security, commodity brokerage, and investment companies; and telephone communications. Industries that also appear in Table 1 are highlighted in boldface. The second column shows the growth in the employment shares between the 1996 and 2000 ORG files (annual averages).
If we had to categorize the high-growth industries generally, however, perhaps their most striking feature is their concentration in services. Of the 20 industries, five of the top 10 and nine of the top 20 are in service industries, defined to include business services, personal services, or professional and related services. Thus, defining new economy industries based on growth rather than high-tech employment generates a list of industries overrepresented by the ''service economy.'' This is of interest because-although it may have preceded the emphasis on the new economy in the popular media-frequent reference has been made to the transition of the US economy (and other developed economies) into service-oriented economies (e.g., Albrecht and Zemke, 1985; Giarini, 1987; Inman, 1985; Ginzberg, 1984) . Thus, workers in industries selected on the basis of growth may highlight an older definition of the new economy, based on services.
One noteworthy industry that shows up on the list of fast-growing industries is personnel supply services. This industry has been cited in prior work as one of the fastest-growing industries and the industry at the forefront of the growth in contingent and alternative work arrangements (Houseman and Polivka, 2000; Segal and Sullivan, 1997). 30 This is a prime illustration of the difference between selecting new economy industries based on growth rather than on high-tech employment, and suggests that the former may reveal more important differences in the employment relationship. Table 3 (those which also appear in Table 1 ), while the third column refers to the remaining industries in Table 3 . The shares are computed from the CWS 1997, 1999, and 2001 files.
Finally, recall that part of the reason for going from a classification of new economy jobs based on high-tech industries to one based on high-tech cities was to capture jobs that tend to surround high-tech industries. One would certainly expect that the industries that are both high-growth and high-tech would be overrepresented in high-tech cities, since it is presumably the fast growth of high-tech industries that warrants the label for the city. That this is the case is illustrated in the second column of Table 4 . This column shows that the three new economy industries based on the fastest growth (from Table 3 ) that are similarly classified based on high-tech employment (from Table 1 ) are overrepresented in every high-tech city and, for half of the cities, overrepresented by a factor of more than 1.5. To better understand the nature of these high-tech cities, it is interesting to ask whether the other (17) high-growth industries in Table 3 also make up a disproportionately large share of employment in these cities. As shown in the last column of Table 4 , this is not the case; the employment shares of these industries in the high-tech cities are near the share in the comparison cities, and generally a bit lower. This indicates that the selection of new economy industries based on growth seems to pick up many industries that are neither high-tech themselves nor particularly related to high-tech industries, which further reinforces the point that a growth-based new economy classification is in some ways fundamentally different from a technology-based one.
Classifying the employment relationship
The Contingent Work Supplements to the Current Population Survey provide a useful classification of the employment relationship that characterizes each worker's job. In particular, these supplements were designed with the express goal of measuring the shares of the workforce in a variety of nontraditional employment relationships, as well as, of course, to collect labor market information on these workers (Polivka, 1996) . The supplements focus on two types of nontraditional relationships-contingent work and alternative employment.
To be defined as a contingent worker, two conditions must hold. 31 First, the individual must be in a job that is temporary, and in which an individual cannot work as long as he/she wishes. Second, an attempt is made to distinguish jobs that are temporary by their nature, compared with jobs that might be temporarily held by a worker who expects to choose to leave (e.g., a youth working in a ''permanent'' fast-food job, but only expecting to remain in it temporarily). Only jobs of the first type are considered contingent. 32 Within that broad definition, the BLS generally uses three definitions of contingent workers, going from more to less restrictive. The most stringent definition is wage and salary workers who expect their job to last 1 year or less and have been in the job for 1 year or less. The self-employed and independent contractors are excluded. Workers with temporary help agencies or contract companies are included if both 1-year criteria apply to their position with the temporary help 31 Details on the classification of contingent and alternative employment are taken from Hipple (1998) . 32 Workers in temporary jobs respond that the job ''could not last as long as they wish'' and that they are ''expecting their job to last a year or less for nonpersonal reasons.'' agency or contract company. The second definition adds in the self-employed and independent contractors for whom both 1-year criteria apply. It also adds in workers with temporary help agencies or contract companies for whom both 1-year criteria apply to their current assignment. Finally, the least restrictive definition drops the 1-year tenure criterion for wage and salary workers.
The classification of workers in alternative employment arrangements is simpler, as this is simply a mutually exclusive classification by the following categories: independent contractors (including consultants and freelance workers, and irrespective of whether they identify themselves as wage and salary workers or self-employed); on-call workers; temporary help agency workers; and workers provided by contract firms. Note that some of these workers may also be counted in some definitions of contingent workers. Finally, with these definitions in hand, it is simple to classify workers dichotomously as either in any contingent/alternative arrangement, or a traditional (noncontingent/nonalternative) arrangement.
The CWS files available for analysis are based on surveys conducted in February of 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001 . In the remainder of this section, we present some descriptive statistics of contingent and alternative work arrangements, before turning to the main analysis, in Section 4, of the relationship between these work arrangements and new economy jobs. The first fact to point out is that at least over the short period captured by these four surveys, the proportions of workers in each type of employment arrangement were relatively stable. These figures are reported in columns (1) - (4) of Table 5 . 33 Looking, for example, at the broadest contingent work category, the percentage declines from 4.9 in 1995 to 4.0 in 2001. The percentage in any alternative arrangement was 9.8 in 1995 and 9.4 in 2001. 34 The percentage in a ''catch-all'' category of any contingent or alternative arrangement declined from 13.2 to 12.1 over the same period. Certainly over this short period there is no sign of increased percentages of employment in contingent or alternative arrangements. 35 The absence of an upward trend in contingent and alternative work has some bearing on one issue regarding the interpretation of the phrase ''new economy,'' discussed earlier.
In particular, we noted that some definitions of the new economy do not pertain to the types of jobs workers do, but rather pertain to more widespread changes in the economy, in which case our inquiry into the relationship between the employment relationship and new economy jobs might miss the mark. The fact that employment relationships as captured in contingent and alternative work arrangements have not increased over the latter part of the 1990s suggests that there was no major shift in employment relationships over time that might be associated with widespread changes in the economy. 36 However, 33 Data were not allocated in the CWS files, and observations with missing data needed to classify workers by contingent or alternative status (and subcategories within these) were dropped. 34 Despite the growth in the personnel supply services industry, there has not been growth in temporary help agency employment due to a decline in the use of temporary help agency workers in other industries. 35 See also Cohany (1998) and US Department of Labor (1999), which produce similar estimates by year (for the earlier years). 36 For additional evidence on changes in the employment relationship more broadly defined, with a particular emphasis on job stability and job security, see the papers in Neumark (2000) .
because the CWS data are only available during the recent period of rapid economic growth, we cannot distinguish business cycle effects from the longer-run time trend; while we do not see an increase in contingent and alternative work, this may be related to tight labor markets during economic growth and not the longer-run trend. On the other hand, to the extent that the downturn had begun by February 2001, there appears to be no associated increase in contingent work and only a slight, statistically insignificant, CWS 1995 CWS , 1997 CWS , 1999 CWS , and 2001 estimates. Percentages are reported, with standard errors of means in parentheses. Work may be classified as both contingent and alternative, so the ''contingent or alternative'' row (for the full sample) is typically less than the sum of the two categories.
Observations are limited to employed civilians, excluding unpaid family members. For the high school diploma or less sample, the sample size in column (7) is 76,389. For the bachelor's or more sample, the sample size in column (7) is 53,069. Nonrespondents to the supplements were dropped. Individuals in school are defined as those in school either part time or full time.
increase in alternative work relative to 1999. Given the short period covered by the CWS and the similarity across these years in the prevalence of contingent and alternative work, we do not focus on changes over time in these employment arrangements, but focus instead on the cross-sectional relationship between employment in new economy jobs and the employment relationship, using the combined information from the pooled Contingent Work Supplements.
Combining across the years of the CWS, the figures indicate that 4.4% of workers are employed in a contingent relationship, 9.6% in an alternative arrangement, and 12.6% in any contingent or alternative employment relationship, as shown in column (5). Finally, the last two columns of the table report figures for two restricted versions of the sample. In column (6), those workers in school either full-time or part-time are dropped. We believe it is potentially useful to isolate contingent and alternative work among nonstudents, as students may be likely to choose contingent work, in particular, as a result of their student status that may make both place of residence and type of work only temporary. The descriptive statistics are consistent with this, as the incidence of each type of contingent work (although not alternative employment relationships) is lower among nonstudents. Finally, column (7) further imposes an age restriction of 18 -65 years (inclusive), to abstract from very young workers sampling jobs while settling on a career, and older workers who may be pursuing short-term employment as part of partial retirement. Imposing this age restriction slightly reduces the incidence of contingent work and alternative work. In the ensuing analysis, we use the sample excluding those in school and focusing on prime-age workers 18 -65 years old (inclusive).
37
The final rows of Table 5 report the share of workers in the combined category of ''contingent or alternative'' work by education level. Workers with a bachelor's degree or more education are more likely to be in contingent or alternative jobs compared to workers with a high school diploma or less education. For both sets of workers, there was a decline in nontraditional work over the late 1990s.
The employment relationship among new economy workers
Having discussed the classification of new economy jobs and of the employment relationship, we finally turn to the relationship between the two. The empirical analysis we present is straightforward. We first report differences in the incidence of contingent or alternative work in new economy jobs vs. other jobs, based on our three alternative classifications of new economy jobs. We then allow for the possibility that individual characteristics such as age, sex, race, etc., are correlated with the likelihood that workers are in new economy jobs, as well as the likelihood that they are in contingent or 37 Our focus is on contingent or alternative work arrangements. However, another possible dimension of nontraditional employment related to the new economy includes self-employment, as illustrated, perhaps, by the apparent increased prevalence of ''startups'' in the high-tech sector. Thus, we also looked at self-employment in a parallel fashion to all of the analyses reported below. To establish a baseline, self-employment rates in the CPS averaged just under 11% across the 1995 -2001 CWS files, declining somewhat over the sample period. alternative employment relationships, estimating linear probability models of the form:
In this generic regression, CA is a dummy variable for a particular contingent or alternative employment relationship, or a combined set of these. NE is a dummy variable indicating that the individual is employed in a new economy job, based on one of our three classifications, and X is a vector of individual control variables, including: age; the square of age; a full set of dummy variables for educational attainment; a dummy variable for female; interactions of the female dummy variable with age and its square and the education dummy variables; a set of dummy variables for black, Hispanic, Asian, and other nonwhites; and a dummy variable for foreign born. The estimate of h therefore measures the shift associated with employment in a new economy job in the probability that a worker is in a particular contingent or alternative employment relationship, for workers otherwise identical in terms of the variables captured in X. Finally, other controls that are intended to further probe the interpretation of the estimate of h are sometimes added; these are explained in describing the analysis for each of the three new economy classifications.
New economy jobs based on employment in high-technology industries
Differences in the employment relationship in new economy jobs using a classification based on high-technology employment are reported in Table 6 . Columns (1) and (2) report the percentages in each type of employment relationship in new economy jobs based on this classification and in other jobs, while column (3) reports the difference between the two. For all three categories of contingent work, the percentage with contingent employment relationships is lower in new economy industries by about 0.6 percentage point using the two more restrictive contingent work measures, and by 0.9 percentage point using the broadest measure. The results are a bit more varied for alternative employment relationships. Employment as an independent contractor or on-call worker is less prevalent in new economy industries (by 1.8 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively), while employment by 38 To account for the heteroskedasticity inherent in the linear probability model, we computed Whitecorrected standard errors as well as boot-strapped standard errors based on 200 iterations. In our data, bootstrapped standard errors tended to be larger than White-corrected (i.e., robust) standard errors. Understatement of standard errors using the White correction (White, 1980 ) is consistent with simulation results for models with continuous dependent variables in MacKinnon and White (1985) . We therefore report the more conservative bootstrapped standard errors. 39 The alternative to the linear probability model is to conceive of CA in Eq.
(1) as a continuous latent variable, assume a distribution for the error term e, and then arrive at a probit model (based on a standard normal distribution) or logit model (based on a standard logistic distribution). While these have some conceptual advantages over the linear probability model, they are misspecified when the distributional assumption is incorrect, while the linear probability model is not. Regardless, we reestimated all of the key specifications as probits and recovered partial effects of the control variables that are comparable to the coefficients of the linear probability model. The results were qualitatively very similar, as is typically the case in using these models (Wooldridge, 2000 , Chapter 7). (4) - (6) report regression-adjusted estimates of the difference in column (3), based on a linear probability model for employment in the indicated category, including a dummy variable for new economy industries and other control variables. The individual controls are described in the text. In column (5), the added controls are the number of workers in the industry averaged over 1996 -2000 ORG files, and the change in the industry employment share from 1996 to 2000 (using annual averages from the ORG files). In column (6), the controls are the same as column (5) but the list of new economy industries is restricted to information technology industries (as shown in Table 1 ). Boot-strapped standard errors are reported in parentheses in columns (4) -(6). See notes to Tables 1 and 5 for additional details. a temporary help agency or contract firm is more prevalent (by 0.4 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively). Overall, in new economy industries, employment in alternative employment relationships is lower by 1.5 percentage points, and employment in any contingent or alternative relationship is lower by 2.5 percentage points. In column (4), the individual-level control variables are added. Generally speaking, these have little impact on the estimated differentials in the employment relationship between new economy industries and other industries. The only sizable difference stems from the reduced relative incidence of employment as an independent contractor in new economy industries, which ultimately increases the overall shortfall of contingent or alternative employment in new economy industries to 3.3 percentage points.
The analysis in Table 6 is intended to focus on the intrinsic differences between industries based on a comparison of high-technology and other industries. But the industries may differ along other dimensions as well. We cannot, of course, include industry dummy variables to capture these other sources of differences, as our new economy classification is industry-based. But it is important to control for other industryrelated differences that might be strongly associated with contingent or alternative employment relationships. The most natural one that raises concerns is industry growth. High-technology industries are likely to be among the faster-growing industries in this sample period (as already illustrated in part by the overlap between Tables 1 and 3), and it is useful to isolate the independent association of contingent or alternative employment relationships with employment in high-tech industries. Consequently, we add to the regression a variable measuring the growth of the industry's share of employment. Of course, given that the results already suggest lower prevalence of contingent and alternative work in high-tech industries, if these industries are in fact higher-growth and faster growth is associated with more contingent and alternative work, then we would expect adding the growth control to, if anything, push the results further in the direction of lower incidence of contingent or alternative work in new economy jobs defined on the basis of high technology, rather than reversing this result. In addition, we control for the overall size of the industry, as larger or smaller industries may differ in their use of nontraditional employment relationships.
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The results are reported in the fifth column of Table 6 . The estimates for contingent employment relationships are changed slightly, in the direction of lower relative prevalence among new economy jobs. The changes in the estimates for alternative arrangements are similarly modest and typically in the same direction. The only substantive change, perhaps, is that the higher use of temporary help agency employment in new economy industries is no longer apparent in the data after including these industry growth and size controls.
The final column of Table 6 limits our definition of new economy industries to those high-technology industries that are also information technology industries (see Table 1 ). 41 We find that contingent and alternative work overall is even less common in information technology industries; looking at the separate categories, the sole exception is that contract firm employment is more common in information technology industries. 40 Details on the construction of these control variables are given in the notes to Table 6 . 41 Workers in industries listed in Table 1 that are not information technology industries are still included in the regression for column (6).
When the analysis is done by education level (final rows), with only the individuallevel controls, the lower mean level of contingent or alternative work in high-tech industries is due to the lower level among workers with a high school diploma or less. However, once we control for industry size and growth, high-tech employment is associated with a lower prevalence of nontraditional work for both highly educated workers and less educated workers, although more so for the latter group. 42 Overall, then, there is virtually no evidence that employment relationships in new economy industries based on a high-technology classification are more likely to take nontraditional forms. The only exception is contract firm employment, which is higher by about 1-2 percentage points in these industries. Rather, in contrast to some of the claims and perceptions discussed in the Introduction, most contingent or alternative employment relationships are less prevalent in new economy industries when defined by hightechnology employment. As a summary measure, the regression estimates with the full set of controls indicate that the percentage of workers in nontraditional employment relationships is 5.7 percentage points lower in new economy industries than in other industries; relative to the sample mean of about 12.6% of the workforce in such arrangements, this implies that contingent or alternative employment relationships are 45% less prevalent in new economy industries.
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In order to understand the role of each new economy industry in driving the results in Table 6 , we replaced the new economy industry dummy variable with a separate dummy variable for each of the 25 new economy industries in Table 1 (regression not shown).
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Compared to the aggregate of other or ''old economy'' industries, 7 of 25 new economy industries had a higher rate of contingent work (under the broadest definition) but none of these higher rates was statistically significant at the 10% level and for only one of these industries-manufacturing of office and accounting machines-was the estimated rate greater than 1 percentage point more than old economy industries. For any alternative relationship, every new economy industry had a lower rate except for management and public relations services, where the rate was almost 22 percentage points higher than in old economy industries. We found a similar result when we combined contingent or alternative work. Every new economy industry, except management and public relations services, had a lower rate of contingent or alternative work than the aggregate of old economy industries, with the differences almost always statistically different from zero at the 5% level. This indicates that the failure to find more use of contingent or alternative work arrangements among high-tech industries is not attributable to the inclusion of industries that use scientific personnel extensively but are not typically thought of as high-techsuch as paints, petroleum, or plastics. Rather, even when looking at industries individually, those more typically associated with computers and information technology generally exhibit lower-not higher-use of contingent or alternative employment. 42 For less educated workers, the regression has a dummy variable for less than a high school diploma. For more educated workers, the regression has a dummy variable for degree attainment beyond the bachelor's degree. Each education dummy variable is interacted with a dummy variable for female workers. 43 Paralleling these findings, the results also pointed to lower self-employment in high-tech industries, with a differential of 7.6 percentage points in the specification corresponding to column (5) of Table 6 . 44 The regression controls were the same as in the final column of Table 6 .
New economy jobs based on residence in high-technology cities
This conclusion could differ, of course, using other definitions of new economy jobs. Attention next turns to the definition based on high-tech cities. Differences in the employment relationship in new economy jobs classified by high-technology cities are reported in Table 7 . As before, columns (1) and (2) report the percentages in each employment relationship in new economy jobs based on this classification and in other jobs, while column (3) reports the difference between the two. In contrast to the results based on high-tech employment, for the classification based on high-tech cities, almost all of these differences are in the direction of greater prevalence of contingent or alternative work in new economy jobs (with many of the differences statistically significant at the 5% level). For the broadest definition of contingent work, the percentage with contingent employment relationships is higher in new economy cities, by about 0.7 percentage point. Among alternative work arrangements, prevalence is higher in these cities for independent contractor, temporary help agency, and contract firm employment. Overall, the prevalence of contingent or alternative employment relationships among workers in new economy cities is higher by 1 percentage point.
Columns (4) and (5) report regression-adjusted estimates paralleling the same columns in Table 6 . The individual-level controls in column (4) increase slightly the estimated differentials in contingent employment between new economy cities and other cities, and increase more sharply the estimated differential in alternative employment relationships. As a summary measure, the relative incidence of contingent or alternative employment in new economy cities rises to 1.2 percentage points. Column (5) adds controls for city size and growth, paralleling the industry-level controls in Table 6 , with the same motivation of isolating the intrinsic nature of employment in these cities, aside from the possibility that employment relationships differ in larger vs. smaller cities, or because of recent growth. Adding these controls raises slightly the relatively higher incidence of contingent work, with the opposite effect regarding alternative work, on net restoring a differential of 1 percentage point higher incidence of contingent or alternative work in high-tech cities.
For workers with a high school diploma or less education, residence in high-tech cities is not associated with a higher prevalence of contingent or alternative work (final rows of Table  7 ). Rather, the high-tech city results are mainly due to the higher prevalence of nontraditional work for workers with a college degree compared to similar workers in other places.
To summarize, employment in high-tech cities, which is one of our methods of delineating new economy jobs, does appear to be characterized by a higher prevalence of contingent and alternative employment, at least for workers with a bachelor's degree or more education. Based on the regression estimates in column (5), contingent employment is higher by 0.9 percentage point and alternative employment is higher by 0.4 percentage point. While these are not large differences in absolute terms, the first is sizable in relative terms, representing 25% higher prevalence of contingent work. Overall, in the combined category of contingent or alternative work, workers with a bachelor's degree or more education have a 10% higher prevalence. 45 These findings contrast rather sharply with those for new economy jobs based on employment in hightech industries. After reporting the high-growth industry results, we explore the role of the industrial mix in high-tech cities to better understand what drives the high-tech city results. (4) - (6) report regression-adjusted estimates of the difference in column (3), based on a linear probability model for employment in the indicated category, including a dummy variable for new economy cities and other control variables. See text for individual controls. In column (5), the added controls are the number of workers in the city averaged over 1996 -2000 ORG files, the change in the city employment share from 1996 to 2000 (using annual averages from the ORG files), and an indicator for noncity (but within-MSA) residence. Boot-strapped standard errors are reported in parentheses in columns (4) and (5). See notes to Tables 2, 5, and 6 for additional details.
New economy jobs based on employment in high-growth industries
Finally, we turn to the third definition of new economy jobs, based simply on employment in the fastest-growing industries. As Table 3 indicated, some of the fastestgrowing industries are high-tech, but by no means all of them. The results for this definition, reported in Table 8 , indicate that new economy jobs are much more likely to use contingent or alternative employment relationships. Looking at columns (1) -(3), every category of contingent or alternative work is significantly more prevalent in the fastestgrowing industries. For the broadest contingent work definition, prevalence among the fastest-growing industries is higher by 2.2 percentage points. The corresponding number for alternative employment relationships is 8.0 percentage points, and for the overall contingent/alternative measure is 8.3 percentage points. The differences remain virtually unchanged when the individual-level regression controls are added in column (4).
In the previous two tables, controls were added for size and growth to try to capture other features of industries (Table 6 ) or cities (Table 7) . Of course, in this table, we are focusing on growth per se, so it would be nonsensical to control for industry growth. However, column (5) does add a control for industry size, which leads to slight decreases in the estimated differentials for broadly defined contingent employment and slight increases for any alternative employment. For the summary measure combining both of these, the estimated prevalence in the fastest-growing industries is higher by 8.0 percentage points, or more than 60% higher relative to the mean prevalence.
The most important high-growth industry for explaining the higher rates of contingent and alternative work is construction. Among the 20 new economy industries defined by fast growth, construction has the largest share of workers at almost 22%. Construction also has a high level of contingent work (6.5% using the broadest definition), alternative work (28%), and combined contingent or alternative work (32%). The second most important industry is personnel supply services. Although personnel supply services has very high rates of contingent work (45%), alternative work (69%), and combined contingent or alternative work (71%), the importance of this industry is limited by its small share of workers-less than 3%.
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To get a better idea of how the employment relationship in new economy jobs based on industry growth differs aside from the influence of these two rather idiosyncratic industries, in column (6) of Table 8 two dummy variables are added for employment in construction and personnel supply services. As expected, this sharply reduces the higher prevalence of temporary help agency employment. Correspondingly, it reduces the estimated differential for any alternative employment arrangement from 8.4 percentage points to 4.1 percentage points. Finally, because much of the employment in these two industries is contingent, the estimated differential for contingent work falls from 2.0 to 0.2 percentage points, and the differential prevalence for any contingent or alternative arrangement falls to 3.7 percentage points, or 30% relative to the mean. Thus, while 46 The questions used to identify workers in temporary help agencies are constructed to attempt to exclude regular employees of temporary help agencies (i.e., those who run or staff the agencies). Thus, the percentage of workers in the personnel supply services industry who are classified as ''temps'' can be well under 100. CWS 1995 CWS , 1997 CWS , 1999 CWS , and 2001 Observations are limited to employed nonenrolled civilians aged 18 -65 years, excluding unpaid family members. The sample size is 180,908 for the full sample, 76,389 for the high school diploma or less sample, and 53,069 for the bachelor's or more sample. Columns (1) -(3) report percentages, with standard errors of means [difference in means in column (3)] in parentheses. Columns (4) and (5) report regression-adjusted estimates of the difference in column (3), based on a linear probability model for employment in the indicated category, including a dummy variable for new economy industries and other control variables. See text for individual controls. In column (5), the added control is the number of workers in the industry averaged over 1996 -2000 ORG files. Column (6) adds a dummy variable for employment in construction and a dummy variable for employment in the personnel supply services industry. Boot-strapped standard errors are reported in parentheses in columns (4) -(6). See notes to Tables 3, 5 , and 6 for additional details.
eliminating consideration of construction and the personnel supply services industry reduces the extent by which new economy jobs appear to rely on contingent and alternative employment relationships, the fact still remains that new economy jobsbased on industry employment growth-do rely substantially more on nontraditional and in particular alternative employment relationships. 47 We also find strong results for growth industries for both highly and less educated workers (final rows).
Of course, it is possible that growth, per se, contributes to the reliance on contingent and alternative workers as fast-growing industries may be more likely to use nontraditional employment relationships. High-growth industries may be experiencing what managers perceive to be a temporary increase in workload and thus there may be a preference for temporary and contingent workers. Furthermore, high-growth industries have a large proportion of new hires who may be employed on a contingent basis to allow firms to screen workers before offering a regular position. 48 In light of these considerations, we might expect that with the exception of a few particular industries such as construction and personnel supply services, high rates of contingent and alternative work in these growth industries will decline when the growth abates.
The industrial mix of employment in high-tech cities
Finally, we report results from analyses intended to probe the higher incidence of contingent or alternative employment in high-tech cities-in particular, trying to understand whether the industrial mix of employment in these cities underlies this higher incidence. First, as we showed in Table 4 , industries that are both high-tech and fastgrowing are overrepresented in high-tech cities. Since high-tech employment is not associated with more contingent and alternative employment relationships, the overrepresentation of high-tech industries alone cannot explain the higher prevalence of such employment relationships in high-tech cities. However, this higher prevalence could be attributable to the overrepresentation of faster-growing industries, given the substantial differentials reported in Table 8 . To assess this question, in Table 9 we add controls for industry size and industry growth (for each worker's industry) to the high-tech city regressions (column (2)). This has little impact on the estimated differentials in contingent employment relationships between high-tech and other cities (compare with column (1), which repeats column (5) of Table 7 ). However, with controls for industry size and growth, the high-tech cities no longer have a significantly higher share of contract firm employment and the higher share of temporary help agency employment is also reduced, with the result that the importance of high-tech cities for any alternative employment is no 47 Paralleling these findings, self-employment is considerably more prevalent in the fast-growing industries, with differentials between 3 and 4 percentage points in specifications corresponding to columns (5) and (6) of Table 8. 48 Houseman and Polivka (2000) report that the main motivation for using alternative employment relationships (in which they include part-time employment) is to handle fluctuations in the workload of regular staff. They also provide evidence that, to a lesser extent, employers use alternative employment relationships to screen workers. We have no clear way to capture this at the industry level, but it may be strongly related to industry growth. longer statistically significant. Looking at the combined category of contingent or alternative work, the coefficient falls from 1.00 to 0.67, suggesting that roughly one-third of the higher incidence of contingent and alternative employment in high-tech cities is due to the size and growth of the industries in high-tech cities. CWS 1997 CWS , 1999 CWS , and 2001 , weighted estimates; the 1995 supplement is not used because it does not have city codes. Observations are limited to employed nonenrolled civilians aged 18 -65 years, excluding unpaid family members. The sample size is 128,556 for the full sample, 53,861 for the high school diploma or less sample, and 38,187 for the Bachelor's or more sample. Columns (1) -(4) report regressionadjusted estimates based on a linear probability model for employment in the indicated category, including a dummy variable for high-technology cities and other control variables. See text for individual controls. Column (1) repeats column (5) from Table 7 . Column (2) adds industry size and growth controls (as in Table 6 ). Column (3) has a dummy variable for each three-digit industry. Column (4) has a dummy variable for each high-tech, high-growth industry (shown in bold in Table 3 ). Boot-strapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. See notes to Table 7 for additional details.
To explore this further, we control for the entire industrial mix in high-tech cities by adding dummy variables for each three-digit industry. The estimates remain essentially unchanged from those that control for industry size and growth (column (3)). The full regression results (not shown) reveal that three of the most important industries for explaining the higher prevalence of contingent and alternative work in high-tech cities are the three high-tech industries that are also high-growth industries (shown in bold in Table 3 ). When we add indicators for each of these three industries, the results are very similar to the results controlling individually for every industry (compare column (4) with column (3)). As before, we find that the high-tech city results hold for workers with a bachelor's degree or more, but not for workers with a high school diploma or less education (final rows).
Thus, we conclude that the prevalence of high-tech and fast-growing industries in hightech cities explains roughly one-third of the higher prevalence of contingent or alternative work in those cities. The remaining two-thirds of the higher prevalence appears to be explained by a distinction captured by our new economy classification based on high-tech cities that differs from those based on employment growth by industry and employment in high-tech industries. Thus, high-tech cities appear to capture another dimension of new economy jobs that utilize contingent and alternative employment relationships at a greater rate than do other jobs.
Conclusion and discussion
The primary goal of this paper is to examine whether new economy jobs are less likely to use traditional employment relationships, and more likely to rely on ''alternative'' or ''contingent'' work. Data on contingent and alternative employment are readily available, based on recent microlevel surveys devoted to measuring employment in these types of arrangements. On the other hand, the phrase ''new economy'' has been used in so many ways (not all of them related to classifications of jobs) that there is, in a sense, an independent research project required to distinguish new economy jobs from other jobs. We do not claim to have the definitive method of so classifying jobs, and indeed we do not believe there is one unique classification. Instead, we develop and use three alternative classification schemes that seem like plausible candidates consistent with what we see as the main conceptions of the new economy based on the world of work: one based on employment in high-tech industries; a second based on residence (and employment) in high-tech cities; and a third based, more mechanically, on employment in fast-growing industries, which tend to be service industries.
Somewhat surprisingly, at least given some popular perceptions of the new economy, when we look at new economy jobs classified on the basis of employment in high-tech industries, we do not find greater use of contingent or alternative employment relationships. In fact, these types of employment relationships are somewhat less prevalent in high-tech industries with the exception of management and public relations services. It may be that high-tech industries do in fact rely on contingent or alternative work as much as or more than other industries, but that they do this in the form of outsourcing some types of work, so that the contingent or alternative workers who do these types of work are not coded as belonging to the high-tech industries.
49 This is one of the motivations for looking at high-tech cities, rather than high-tech industries, to see whether the employment relationships that surround high-tech industries are different. In fact, when we classify new economy workers based on residence in high-tech cities, contingent and alternative employment relationships are more common, even after accounting for the faster employment growth in these cities. These differentials are in part attributable to the overall industrial mix of employment in these cities, although this extends beyond employment in the typical ''high-tech'' industries. Combining all contingent and alternative categories, workers in new economy jobs classified in this way are 8% more likely to be in contingent or alternative employment arrangements. Defining ''new economy'' more literally to be those industries with the fastest growth yields the most striking differences, as workers in the 20 fastest-growing industries are more than 60% more likely to be in contingent or alternative employment relationships, although a large chunk of this difference is driven by employment in the fast-growing construction and personnel supply services industries where employment is perhaps ''intrinsically'' contingent or alternative.
Of course, the numbers are only suggestive, as-even under the most favorable view of our means of identifying new economy jobs-we do not have a rigid sorting of workers into new economy jobs and other jobs, but rather into groups of workers in which new economy jobs are more and less prevalent. This suggests that the ''true'' differential between new economy jobs and other jobs could be considerably larger. While the exact magnitudes of the differentials are therefore uncertain, the data nonetheless indicate significantly greater use of contingent and alternative employment relationships in new economy jobs when these jobs are defined by employment in high-tech cities, and what would have to be considered large differences between new economy jobs and other jobs when new economy jobs are defined by employment in fast-growing industries.
To the extent that the personnel supply services industry is a feature of the new economy, and continues its rapid growth, it will contribute an increasing share of contingent employment. Furthermore, it has clearly grown into a nontrivial industry, exceeding 2% of total employment in the late 1990s (Houseman and Polivka, 2000) , and although the industry cannot indefinitely continue its past growth rate of 11% per year from 1972 to 1995 (Segal and Sullivan, 1997) , it clearly has the potential to partially drive aggregate trends in contingent and alternative employment relationships. 50 Nonetheless, based on the evidence we present, there appears to be a positive link, generally, between new economy jobs defined on the basis of industry employment growth and contingent or alternative employment relationships; the link does not stem solely from the fact that the personnel supply services industry-which is based on contingent or alternative employment-is among the fastest-growing industries.
Our findings, of course, do not speak to the general notion of the relationship between the new economy and contingent or alternative employment. Rather, they speak only to the relationship based on our classifications of new economy jobs. As such, what do the findings imply? Does the development of the new economy presage the erosion of the traditional employment relationship? Employment in high-technology industries, per se, is not associated with less reliance on the traditional employment relationship. However, one of the motivations for looking at high-tech cities was to capture employment in the jobs that more typically grow up and develop around these high-tech industries, and the greater use of contingent and alternative employment in high-tech cities indicates that such employment is less likely to use the traditional relationship. To the extent that the high-tech city classification of new economy jobs focuses on jobs that do not rely on high-tech employment per se, but rather jobs that are intertwined with high-tech industries, the experiences of workers in high-tech cities may provide us with some basis for predicting what will happen as the economy as a whole moves in the directions experienced first in these cities (assuming this occurs). Looking at the data this way provides a basis for expecting some erosion of traditional employment relationships, although not dramatic changes.
But in terms of predicting future changes in the employment relationship, there is some intuitive appeal to getting away from a priori classifications of industries or cities, and simply looking at the fastest-growing industries, as these industries are most likely to represent a growing share of employment and hence, in the most literal sense, to develop into the new economy. The analysis of new economy jobs based on industry employment growth does point more strongly to erosion of traditional employment relationships. There are, however, a couple of qualifications to extrapolating from the finding of higher prevalence of contingent or alternative work in the fastest-growing industries to the conclusion that traditional employment relationships will become less common in the aggregate.
First, recall that in the aggregate the prevalence of contingent or alternative work has not increased and, if anything, fell slightly over the 1995 -2001 period. This suggests that growth in industries with a higher prevalence of such work may have been offset by declines in these types of employment relationships in other industries. It is only under the assumption of stability in the prevalence of contingent or alternative work in other industries that higher prevalence of such work in the fastest-growing industries implies higher future prevalence in the aggregate. In fact, over the sample period, there is a declining prevalence of contingent or alternative work in both sets of industries-the fastgrowing industries as well as the others. Our guess is that this does not reflect a declining reliance, overall, on contingent or alternative employment, but instead arises because, in a very tight labor market, employers are more compelled to offer more traditional employment packages. Regardless, this emphasizes that faster growth of industries with a higher prevalence of contingent or alternative work need not imply rising prevalence of such work overall.
Second, to some extent growth, per se, may be the prime determinant of reliance on contingent or alternative employment, rather than something intrinsic about the growing industries. Thus, as these recently fast-growing industries mature and presumably experience slowing growth, reliance on contingent and alternative employment may fall. Obviously, then, some of the questions relevant to interpreting the results and their likely implications cannot be answered from the available data. In this regard, though, the important contribution played by the personnel supply services industry is informative, as this industry is intrinsically based on contingent and alternative work, and therefore would not be expected to revert to more traditional employment relationships as its growth slows. It is only a matter of conjecture, of course, as to how large this industry can grow, but its apparently inevitable larger share in the US economy does make more likely a possibly significant and long-lasting increase in contingent and alternative employment relationships, assuming that recent declines in these types of relationships in other industries are only temporary.
It is important to emphasize the provisional nature of these conclusions, however. The plethora of meanings of the phrase ''new economy,'' as well as the difficulty of operationalizing particular meanings of the phrase, imply that researchers are likely to come up with a multitude of different ways of measuring the new economy, and any of these is likely to have some subjective component. We have tried to focus on objective criteria for classifying new economy jobs, when possible, based on studies done prior to this one. But we strongly suspect that a few years down the road, numerous other studies will propose and consider different ways of classifying new economy jobs, and the answers one gets to questions about employment relationships in the new economy may depend on how these jobs are classified. Thus, this paper may ultimately serve more to raise these questions and stimulate research on this topic than to provide definitive answers.
